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1 Introduction
This paper builds on the methodology of Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018) and derives estimates of the
size and monetary value of the shadow economy for a panel of countries between 1950 and 2015.
In a nutshell, the methodology uses the restrictions imposed by a full-fledged dynamic general
equilibrium (GE) model to measure the size and dynamic behavior of the shadow economy. While
earlier GE-based contributions have attempted to do this, they all omit one key factor, which is to
consider the trends that are observed in the formal (measured) economy.1,2
To see why this matters, consider the works of Ihrig and Moe (2004) or Elgin and Öztu-
nalı (2012); both of these are highly-cited and GE-based works. The former considers stationary
economies only, which forego all the information contained in the real-world trends. The latter
imposes dynamic relationships between the model’s trend growth rates that are not necessarily
equilibrium rates. As shown by Solis-Garcia and Xie, incorporating the trends of the model into
the analysis provides a very different picture of the underground economy.
The main contribution of the paper is a dataset that offers time series for (a) formal-sector
real GDP (hereafter RGDP), (b) shadow-sector RGDP, (c) total (formal plus shadow) RGDP, and
(d) the size of the shadow economy as a fraction of the formal economy. The dataset includes 60
countries, yet data availability forces us to have staggered starting dates: 30 countries have data
for the entire sample (1950–2015), 15 countries begin in 1970, and the remaining 15 do so in 1990.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the methodology used to
generate the values in the paper and Section 3 presents some data preliminaries. Finally, Section
4 presents some aggregated results and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the country
1 Other papers use econometric techniques to infer the size of the shadow economy (e.g., Medina and Schneider
2017 or Schneider et al. 2010); as documented in Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018), this methodology exhibits some issues
when looking at the dynamics of the shadow economy.
2 Simply put, the cross-equation restrictions that arise from GE effects generate strong implications about how
the shadow economy can evolve over time. We exploit these implications in the paper.
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classifications for all the Figures in Section 4, while Appendix B presents a table with summary
statistics of the size of the shadow economy for all countries in the sample. All the data discussed
in the paper can be found in XLSX format at the corresponding author’s website.3
2 A brief review of the methodology
This is an abridged description of the methodology we use to derive the results. For additional
details, see Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018).
2.1 Economic environment
We consider a deterministic environment consisting of a representative household-producer and a
government; in what follows, uppercase letters denote trending variables while lowercase letters
denote stationary variables.
Household-producer The household-producer chooses sequences of consumption Ct, hours worked
Nt, and investment Xt to maximize the discounted flow of period utilities, namely
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt −
ΓHtN
1+χ
t
1 + χ
)
.
In the expression above, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, χ ≥ 0 represents the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, and ΓHt is a permanent shock that affects the household’s labor supply.
The household-producer’s maximization is subject three constraints. First, a law of motion for
capital
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt, (2.1)
3 See http://www.macalester.edu/~msolisga.
3
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate and Kt denotes the stock of physical capital. Second, a
time constraint of the form
Nt = NFt +NSt, (2.2)
where NFt denotes hours worked in the formal sector and NSt does so for the shadow sector. Third,
a budget constraint
Ct + ΓAtXt = (1− τt)K
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α + (ΓStNSt)
η, (2.3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital income share in formal output, η > 0 is the labor share in shadow
output, ΓAt is a permanent shock to the production of investment goods, and τt ∈ (0, 1) is a tax
on formal sector output. The last term in (2.3) represents shadow sector output; importantly,
we assume that the government cannot tax output produced underground.4 Formal and shadow
production technologies are subject to the permanent productivity shocks ΓFt and ΓSt.
Government sector The literature on the shadow economy (e.g., Ihrig and Moe 2004) has
empirically shown that tax rates are negatively related to shadow sector size; we incorporate this
feature of the data by including a government sector. In particular, we assume that the government
uses tax revenue to pay for wasteful expenditure Gt and that it complies with the period-by-period
budget constraint
Gt = τtK
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α. (2.4)
Exogenous variables The set of (permanent) exogenous variables is given by ΓHt, ΓAt, and
ΓFt; Proposition 2.1 below shows that ΓSt is an endogenous variable. Letting git denote the gross
4 See Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018) for a discussion on why adding an audit probability to the shadow sector
production doesn’t change the results that follow.
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growth rate of variable i = H,A, F, S, it’s obvious that
git =
Γit
Γi,t−1
,
and
Γit =
t∏
s=1
gis. (2.5)
2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions of the economy are as follows. First, by the household-producer con-
straints described above:
Ct + ΓAtXt +Gt = K
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α + (ΓStNSt)
η (2.6)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt (2.7)
Nt = NFt +NSt. (2.8)
Second, we add an intertemporal condition
ΓAtC
−1
t = αβC
−1
t+1(1− τt+1)K
α−1
t+1 (ΓF,t+1NF,t+1)
1−α + β(1− δ)ΓA,t+1C
−1
t+1, (2.9)
two intratemporal conditions—for formal and shadow labor, respectively
ϕΓHtN
χ
t = (1− α)C
−1
t (1− τt)K
α
t Γ
1−α
Ft N
−α
Ft (2.10)
ηΓηStN
η−1
St = (1− α)(1− τt)K
α
t Γ
1−α
Ft N
−α
Ft , (2.11)
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and the government budget constraint
Gt = τtK
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α. (2.12)
Third, we add expressions for formal (YFt), shadow (YSt), and total (Yt) output, namely
YFt = K
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α (2.13)
YSt = (ΓStNSt)
η (2.14)
Yt = YFt + YSt. (2.15)
These expressions provide a clean mapping between theory and data. Finally, we also derive an
expression for the decentralized price of investment goods, given by
PXt = ΓAt. (2.16)
2.3 The role of trend growth
Theory There are four model trends in the economy: the household’s choice of hours worked
(ΓHt ), the production of investment goods (ΓAt ), and formal and shadow technology productivity
(ΓFt and ΓSt ). The main object of interest is the sequence {ΓSt }; in order to derive a measure of the
shadow economy, we first build a map between (equilibrium) observed and model growth rates, as
detailed in Proposition 2.1 below (all proofs can be found in Solis-Garcia and Xie 2018):
Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium growth rates of the capital stock, gK ; (formal and shadow)
hours worked, gN ; (formal, shadow, and total) output, gY ; and the permanent shock to the shadow
6
production function, gS, are given by
gK = g
−1/(1+χ)
H g
−1/(1−α)
A gF (2.17)
gN = g
−1/(1+χ)
H (2.18)
gY = g
−1/(1+χ)
H g
−α/(1−α)
A gF (2.19)
gS = g
−(1+η)/[(1+χ)η]
H g
−α/[(1−α)η]
A g
1/η
F . (2.20)
Equation (2.20) is key, as it links the evolution of the shadow sector to the exogenous growth
rates of the model {gH , gA, gF } along the equilibrium path. We now show how to calculate these
growth rates from real-world data.
Data Let {gˆK , gˆNF , gˆYF } denote the observed long-run averages of the growth rates of physical
capital, formal hours worked, and formal output. The relation between theory and real-world rates
follows
Proposition 2.2. The map between the exogenous growth rates {gH , gA, gF } and the observed
growth rates {gˆK , gˆNF , gˆYF } is given by:
gH = gˆ
−(1+χ)
NF
(2.21)
gA = gˆYF gˆ
−1
K (2.22)
gF =
(
gˆYF
gˆαK gˆ
1−α
NF
)1/(1−α)
. (2.23)
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2.4 Parametrization and solution method
We set α = 1/3 and χ = 1;5 we also need the following
Assumption 2.3. The observed (real-world) value of RGDP corresponds to formal output YFt.
To obtain the value of the shadow sector labor input parameter η, we first need to pin down
the value of the shadow-formal output ratio for some base year t0; call this value Y[S/F ],t0 . By
construction,
Y[S/F ],t0 =
YS,t0
YF,t0
(2.24)
and hence, using real-world data for formal output, shadow output at t0 is given by
YS,t0 = Y[S/F ],t0YF,t0 . (2.25)
Take (2.24) once more, but now substitute the definition of YS,t0 , equation (2.14):
Y[S/F ],t0 =
(ΓS,t0NS,t0)
η
YF,t0
.
From this expression we can easily solve for NS,t0 , which equals
NS,t0 =
(Y[S/F ],t0YF,t0)
1/η
ΓS,t0
. (2.26)
To wrap up, solve for η from the intratemporal condition (2.11):
η =
(1− α)(1− τt0)YF,t0NS,t0
NF,t0YS,t0
.
5 The technical appendix to Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018) contains a sensitivity analysis over the values of χ; it also
shows that dropping the assumption of logarithmic utility over consumption doesn’t result in a major quantitative
change.
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and substitute from (2.25) and (2.26) to get6
η =
(1− α)(1− τt0)Y
1/η
F,t0
Y
(1−η)/η
[S/F ],t0
NF,t0ΓS,t0
. (2.27)
Expression (2.27) is a nonlinear equation in η; note that all the variables in the right-hand side of
the equation—other than η—are known. We use a fixed point procedure to find the value of η such
that (2.27) is satisfied (the fixed point algorithm is detailed in Solis-Garcia and Xie 2018).
3 Data preliminaries
3.1 Sources
From the Penn World Table 9.0 (see Feenstra et al. 2015) we obtain the following variables (where
appropriate, mnemonics are indicated in parenthesis):
1. Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (rgdpna).
2. Capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (rkna).
3. Share of government consumption at current PPPs (cshg).
4. Price level of capital formation (pli).
From The Conference Board,7 we obtain the following variables:
5. Midyear population.
6. Total annual hours worked.
From the work of Medina and Schneider (2017), we get
6 From (2.4) and period-by-period government budget balance we get that τt0 = Gt0/[Kαt0(ΓF,t0NF,t0)1−α] =
Gt0/YF,t0 ; the rightmost term can be backed out from real-world data.7 See The Conference Board Total Economy DatabaseTM, May 2016, http://www.conference‑board.org/data/economydatabase/.
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7. Shadow-to-formal output ratio, with base year 1991.8
Using the items above, our model variables are obtained as follows:
8. Formal GDP per capita: 1/5.
9. Capital stock per capita: 2/5.
10. Price of investment: 4.
11. Hours worked per capita: 6/5.
12. Shadow-to-formal output ratio: 7.
3.2 Aggregation
The series presented in Section 4 below are weighted averages of the shadow-to-formal output ratio,
using country population as a weight. In each case, data from multiple countries are averaged
according to criteria such as region, income level, and so on.
Each weighted series is constructed as follows. First, we partition the set of countries into M
groups, denoted by {G1, . . . , GM}, with typical element Gm; each group Gm has Nm elements,
where we don’t require that Nm = Nm′ for m ̸= m′. Second, let pmjt be the population of country j
in group Gm at period t. Similarly, let wmjt be the weighing factor of country j at period t, defined
as
wmjt =
pmjt∑
j p
m
jt
, for j ∈ Gm.
(Note how each weighing factor is relative to a particular group Gm.) Finally, let Y m[S/F ], jt be the
shadow-to-formal output ratio of country j in group Gm at period t. Then the weighted shadow-
8 See Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018) for an explanation on why we choose to use this source.
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to-formal output ratio of group Gm in period t is
Y m[S/F ],t =
∑
j∈Gm
wmjt Y
m
[S/F ], jt, for j ∈ Gm.
4 Results
We now present time series for the size of the shadow economy, aggregated across four main
dimensions: region, income level, trade block, and trade openness.9
4.1 By region
A limited sample of countries have data from 1950 onwards; consequently, some trends differ
markedly once more countries are included in later time series.10 The first point of interest in
Figure 1 is the marked decline of the shadow economy in Europe and Central Asia, of which the
1950 sample primarily consisted of western European countries, over the observed period. The
decline continues up to 1980, after when it stabilizes around 20% of formal RGDP. Conversely,
the size of the shadow economy in Latin America and the Caribbean has been on an upward trend
since 1970—and has been consistently larger than all other regions during this period. The shadow
economy in East Asia and Pacific and North America has remained small, hovering around 10% of
formal RGDP.
The full sample from 1990 onward confirms some trends and reveals others that were not
apparent in the smaller 1950 sample. In particular, Figure 2 shows that the size of the shadow
economy in South Asia has been as large as that in Latin America and the Caribbean up to 2000.
After that year, South Asia’s shadow-to-formal output ratio nearly doubles: it measures about 70%
of formal output in 2015. For comparison, the value for Latin America and the Caribbean is 50%
9 Details on how we classify countries within each dimension are found in Appendix A.
10 To ease comparison between samples, Figures 1 and 2 share the same y-axis scale.
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Figure 1 Average shadow-to-formal ratio, grouped by continent, for countries with data
available from 1950.
for the same year. For East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North
Africa, we observe a slow increase through 1990–2015; the first two regions average a bit over 30%
of formal output by 2015, while the last region is closer to 40% for the same year.
4.2 By income level
The series in Figure 3 reveal marked disparities among income levels. While the size of the shadow
economy is virtually constant over the observed period in high income countries, it is consistently
increasing in lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. Note, interestingly, that the shadow-
to-formal output ratio is larger in upper-middle income countries—though the gap seems to be
closing over time.
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Figure 2 Average shadow-to-formal ratio, grouped by continent, for countries with data
available from 1990.
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Figure 3 Average shadow-to-formal ratio, by income per capita, for countries with data
available from 1990.
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Figure 4 Average shadow-to-formal ratio, by trade block, for countries with data available
from 1990.
4.3 By trade block
Figure 4 in large part confirms the trends observed in Figure 2. The size of the shadow economy
among MERCOSUR countries—all located in the Latin America and the Caribbean region—is
once again the largest relative to the other trade blocks. Countries in the APEC block find their
shadow sector steadily increasing in size (relative to formal output) after 1995, while those in the
EU exhibit a slight decrease after 2007. Note also how the NAFTA block compares to the North
America region from Figure 2: the jump from a bit over 10% to over 20% comes exclusively by the
inclusion of Mexico (included in the Latin America and the Caribbean region).
4.4 By trade openness
To derive Figure 5, we first calculate the median trade openness for all the countries in the sample.
Countries whose trade openness was greater than the median were classified as high trade openness,
and vice versa. Figure 5 shows that prior to 2000 both groups of countries had a very similar level
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Figure 5 Average shadow-to-formal ratio, by trade openness, for countries with data avail-
able from 1990.
of shadow-to-formal output ratio; a gap begins to form after that year and by 2015, the size of the
gap is about 6 percentage points.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used the methodology of Solis-Garcia and Xie (2018) to derive estimates
of the size and monetary value of the shadow economy for a panel of countries between 1950 and
2015. We also provide some graphical illustrations that characterize the evolution of the size of
the shadow economy (relative to formal output) over time. Though far from a careful econometric
analysis, these illustrations are an early contribution into tapping the potential of the dataset.
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A Country categories
A.1 Figures 1 and 2
We follow the region classification offered by the World Bank.11
East Asia and Pacific Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Europe and Central Asia Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
11 The classification can be found in https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519.
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Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Latin America and the Caribbean Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Middle East and North Africa Israel and Malta.
North America Canada and the United States.
South Asia Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
A.2 Figure 3
We follow the income classification offered by the World Bank. (See Footnote 11.)
Lower-middle income Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Vietnam.
Upper-middle income Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Malaysia,
Mexico, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
High income Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
A.3 Figure 4
We assign countries to one (or more) of the major trade blocks, depending on membership. We
consider the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), European Union (EU), MERCOSUR,
and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) groups.
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APEC Australia, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the
United States.
EU Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, and United States.
A.4 Figure 5
We first obtain a measure of trade openness from the World Bank;12 then, we calculate the median
value of openness (equal to 0.7850) and classify countries into high and low trade openness groups
accordingly.
High trade openness Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Low trade openness Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, France, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Russian Federation, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
12 See http://data.worldbank.org. We use the Trade (% of GDP) measure, defined as the sum of exports and
imports as a percentage of GDP. This measure is attached to a particular year, so we only have one observation.
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B Size of the shadow economy
Country Start year Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Argentina 1950 0.2966 0.0474 0.1689 0.3672
Australia 1950 0.1819 0.0213 0.1451 0.2166
Austria 1950 0.1144 0.0245 0.0902 0.1644
Bangladesh 1970 0.4871 0.1975 0.3122 0.9203
Belgium 1950 0.3192 0.0807 0.2175 0.4970
Brazil 1950 0.3789 0.0502 0.3095 0.4535
Bulgaria 1990 0.4483 0.0696 0.3480 0.6114
Canada 1950 0.2233 0.0365 0.1694 0.2882
Chile 1970 0.1949 0.0585 0.1036 0.2827
Colombia 1950 0.3654 0.1140 0.2421 0.6335
Costa Rica 1990 0.4240 0.0890 0.2864 0.5716
Cyprus 1950 0.2544 0.0863 0.1477 0.3981
Czech Republic 1990 0.1951 0.0126 0.1768 0.2163
Denmark 1950 0.2672 0.0686 0.1859 0.4198
Estonia 1990 0.2589 0.0384 0.1962 0.3317
Finland 1950 0.3320 0.0969 0.1859 0.4802
France 1950 0.2414 0.1167 0.1313 0.5292
Germany 1950 0.2510 0.1160 0.1278 0.4764
Greece 1970 0.3335 0.0455 0.2505 0.4486
Hong Kong 1970 0.1828 0.0167 0.1503 0.2170
Hungary 1990 0.3264 0.0288 0.2777 0.4089
Iceland 1950 0.1704 0.0224 0.1322 0.2442
Indonesia 1970 0.2228 0.0625 0.1147 0.3258
Ireland 1950 0.3192 0.0908 0.2012 0.5444
19
Country Start year Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Israel 1990 0.3272 0.0374 0.2318 0.3814
Italy 1950 0.3546 0.0836 0.2629 0.5438
Jamaica 1990 0.3564 0.0327 0.3129 0.4361
Japan 1950 0.1009 0.0226 0.0647 0.1409
Latvia 1990 0.1879 0.0326 0.1447 0.2815
Lithuania 1990 0.1903 0.0303 0.1464 0.2500
Luxembourg 1950 0.1271 0.0412 0.0767 0.2201
Malaysia 1970 0.3861 0.1003 0.2194 0.5930
Malta 1970 0.3099 0.0320 0.2446 0.4005
Mexico 1950 0.2986 0.1305 0.1393 0.5362
Netherlands 1950 0.1978 0.0421 0.1315 0.2840
New Zealand 1950 0.2189 0.0248 0.1607 0.2680
Norway 1950 0.2907 0.0706 0.2213 0.5129
Pakistan 1970 0.4259 0.0431 0.3596 0.5027
Peru 1950 0.6614 0.1939 0.4324 1.0248
Philippines 1970 0.5150 0.0321 0.4154 0.5941
Poland 1990 0.3314 0.0304 0.2705 0.3782
Portugal 1950 0.2200 0.0425 0.1589 0.3142
Romania 1990 0.2288 0.0687 0.1529 0.3957
Russian Federation 1990 0.5013 0.0994 0.3358 0.6262
Singapore 1970 0.1294 0.0494 0.0444 0.2097
Slovak Republic 1990 0.1717 0.0169 0.1370 0.2169
Slovenia 1990 0.2539 0.0250 0.2232 0.3444
South Korea 1970 0.2605 0.0390 0.1621 0.3305
Spain 1950 0.4069 0.1198 0.1989 0.6302
Sri Lanka 1970 0.6387 0.1488 0.3324 0.8740
20
Country Start year Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Sweden 1950 0.2573 0.0492 0.2012 0.3812
Switzerland 1950 0.0926 0.0109 0.0773 0.1140
Taiwan 1970 0.2791 0.0393 0.1801 0.3373
Thailand 1970 0.4755 0.1040 0.2629 0.6439
Turkey 1950 0.5734 0.3446 0.3166 1.7362
United Kingdom 1950 0.1896 0.0334 0.1439 0.2620
United States 1950 0.1043 0.0163 0.0772 0.1371
Uruguay 1990 0.4622 0.0716 0.3254 0.5637
Venezuela 1950 0.3001 0.0735 0.1963 0.4606
Vietnam 1970 0.1852 0.0468 0.1217 0.2617
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